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NOTES
EXTINGUISHMENT OF THE INTERESTS OF UNBORN
CONTINGENT REMAINDERMEN BY JUDICIAL
PROCESS
It is a rule of common law that a contingent remainder is de-
stroyed by the destruction or determination of the particular estate
before the vesting of the remainder.' However, in England by a
series of statutes, the last of which was enacted in 1877, the des-
tructibility rule has been completely abolished.2  In the United
States, a considerable number of states have abolished it in whole
or in part,3 but a few jurisdictions still recognize this rule.4
This note is guided by the Restatement5 and examines the present
status of the destructibility rule, with particular reference to the
termination of rights in unborn remaindermen.
I. THE EQUITABLE DOCTRINE OF REPRESENTATION
The courts of equity have long recognized the right of one or a
few persons to sue for themselves and others so situated. 6 This is
the doctrine of representation 7 or "virtual representation," as it is
often referred to,s and represents an exception to the general rule
that no person is bound by a judgment or decree, except parties
1. For general statements of this rule and explanations, see CHALLIS, REAL PROP-
ERTY 119-151 (3d ed. 1911); 1 SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS §§ 193-197 (2d ed.
1956). A careful analysis is given in FEARNE, CONTINGENT REMAINDERS 316-
350 (1831).
2. 7 & 8 Vict. c. 76 (1844); 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106 (1845); 40 & 41 Vict. c. 33
(1877).
3. 1 SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS § 207 nn. 90-99. 1-11 (2d ed. 1956) gives
a list as to states wholly abolishing the destructibility rude; I SIMES, op. cit. suprea
at no. 12-15 wherein states having statutes designed to eliminate destruction by merger
or forfeiture, but which do not prevent contingent remainders from failure by reason
of the natural termination of the preceding estate before the remainder vests, are given.
N.D. Rev. Code §§ 47-0230, 47-0232 (1943) wholly abolishing the rule provide: * "No
future interest can be defeated or barred by any alienation or other act of the owner of the
intermediate or precedent interest, nor by any destruction of such precedent interest
by forfeiture, surrender, merger, or otherwise .... .. and "No future interest, valid in fts
creation, is defeated by -he determinat'on of the precedent interest before the happening
of the contingency on which the future interest is limited to take effect, but should such
contingency afterwards happen, the future interest takes effect in the same manner
and to the same extent as if the precedent interest had continued to the same period."
4. Popp v. Bond, 158 Fla. 185, 28 So2d 259 (1946); Blocker v. Blocker, 103 Fla.
285, 137 So. 249 (1931); Love v. Lindstedt, 76 Ore. 66, 147 Pac. 935 (1915);
Ryan v. Monaghan, 99 Tenn. 338, 42 S.W. 144 (1897).
5. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 182 (1936).
6. See Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921); POMEROY,
REMEDIES AND REMEDIAL RIGHTS §§ 388-390 (2d ed. 1883); STORY, EQUI.TY
PLEADING §§ 97-99, 103, 107, 110, 111, 116, 120 (8th ed. 1870).
7. Montgomery v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 83 F.2d 758 (7th Cir. 1936).
8. In Groves v. Burton, 125 Ind. App. 302, 123" N.E.2d 204, 209 (1954) the court
stated: "It is generally referred to as the doctrine of virtual representation."
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or those who stand in privity with parties. 9  Under this doctrine,
those not in esse may be bound by decree if they are represented
by those who have interests so closely similar to the interest of the
unborn persons that effective protection is certain to be extended.'0
This doctrine makes a judgment conclusive upon unborn remain-
dermen if any party to the procecdings had an equal incentive to
produce the same evidence and argue the same rules of law as the
person not in being.1' The persons not parties are held to be
parties or "virtually" so.
12
Adequate presentation of the legal position of the unborn per-
son is sustained if the representative and the unborn person share
as members of a class' 3 or the representative is the living owner of
the first estate of inheritance.' 4 The decree must operate with equal
regard for the interests of the unborn person and the representa-
tive, 5 and their interests cannot be adverse."
9. See Garside v. Garside, 80 Cal.App.2d 318, 181 P.2d 665, 671 (1947): Fabren-
wald v. Spokane Savings Bank, 179 Wash. 61, 35 P.2d 1117,1118 (1934).
1o. Gavin v. Curtin, 171 111. 640, 49 N.E. 523 (1898); Hale v. I-ale, 146 111.
22'i, 33 N.E. 858 (1893); Bofil v. Fisher, 3 Rich.Eq. I (S.C. 18'0). In Groves v.
Burton, supra note 8, the court stated: "The doctrine may be generally stated in this
wise: Persons having a remote, contingent, or expectant interest in re',y are bnund lv
the judgment rendered ir proper circumstances in, an action ccnerning prop-rty,
although not made parties to the suit, if their interests are properly represented, as by
the holder of the first estate of inheritance, or by persons wno hve the same interests
and are equally certain 'to bring forward the entire merits of the question, so as to
give the contingent interest effective protection."
11. Webster v. State Mut. Life Assur. Co., 50 F.Supp. 11 (S.D. Cal. 1943); Los
Angeles County v. Winans, 13 Cal.App. 234, 109 Pac. 640 (1910); Hale v. Hale, -upra
note 10.
12. As to the doctrine of virtual representation, RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 183
(1936) Provides: "PREREQUISITES FOR REPRESENTATION OF UNBORN PERSON.
"A person unborn at the time of the commencement of a judicial proceeding is duly
represented therein by a person duly joined as a party thereto when
"'(a) the person so joined as a party, and the unborn person, sustain to each other
such a relationship that an adequate preesntation of the legal position of the party would
be an adequate presentation of the legal position of the unborn person; and
"(b) the judgment, decree or other result of such proceeding operates with equal
regard for the possible interests of the persbn joined as a party and of the unborn person;
and
"(c) the conduct of the person so joined as a party constitutes a sufficient protection
under the rule stated in § 185."
As to what is sufficient protection, RESTATEMENT, op. cit. supra § 185 lays down
the following:
"The conduct of the person joined as a party constitutes the 'sufficient protecton'
required in. . .§ 183(c) for the representation of living or unborn persons whenever it
does not appear affirmatively that such person acted in hostility to the interest of the
person claimed to have been represented by him."
See Webster v. State Mut. Life Assur. Co., 50 F.Supp. 11, 15 (S.D. Cal. 1943)
where the court sets forth these requirements. See also Marby v, Scott, 51 Gal.App.2d
245, 124 P.2d 659,663 (1942) wherein the court in discussing the doctrine of reprq.
sentation gave approval to the Restatement presentation.
13. Graff v. Rankin, 250 Fed. 150 (7th Cir. 1918); Wolf v. Uhlemann, 325 Il. 1653,
156 N.E. 334 (1927); John Hancock Mut Life Ins. Co. v. Dower, 222 Iowa 1377,
271 N.W. 193 (1937); Johnson v. Johnson, 276 S.W. 776 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
14. Knotts v. Stearns, 91 U.S. 638 (1875); Gray v. Smith, 76 Fed. 525 (N.D. Cal.
1896); Doremnus v. Danham, 55 N.J.Eq. 511, 37 Atl. 62 (1897).
15. See Webster v. State Mut. Life Assur. Co., 50 F.S upp. 11,16 (S.D. Cal. 1943);
2 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 296 at 574 (1950).
10. Mortimore v. Bashore, 417 Ill. 535, 148 N.E. 317 (1925); Bowen v. Gent, 54
NoRTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
In Rasmusson v. Schmalenberger1 the plaintiff held a life estate
with remainder to the lawful issue of his body, share and share
alike. Plaintiff brought action in the District Court making his
children defendants, and received authorization to convey and sell
the property. Subsequently he entered into a contract for sale
with the defendant. The defendant refused to perform on the
ground plaintiff did not have marketable title because the owners
of the remainder were undetermined, the decree of the District
Court could not bind them, and they were wholly unaffected by
the judgment. The Supreme Court of North Dakota held that the
judgment was binding, not only upon all living chillren who were
made parties to the action, but also upon all children having con-
tingent interests in the property who might be born thereafter. The
court stated: "The general rule that no person shall be bound by
an adjudication in an action to which he is in no way a party
has some exceptions and does not inexorably apply to a case where
at the time of the adjudication persons are not in esse who may be
affected thereby. If an estate is vested in persons living, subject
only to the contingency that persons may be born who will have an
interest therein, the living owners of the estate, for all purposes of
any litigation in reference thereto, represent the whole estate and
stand not only for themselves, but also for the persons unborn, and
a judgment entered in such litigation binds their interests . .'a
There are various reasons advanced for the application of this
doctrine, but necessity and expediency would seem sufficient.19
In some cases, it may happen that lack of adequate representa-
tion is not called to the court's attention in the original suit, since it
is not truly an adversary proceeding. Any settlement in such a
case can be attacked at a subsequent time after the remaindermen
come into being.20
Md. 555 (1880); Downey v. Seib, 185 N.Y. 427, 78 N.E. 66 (1906); Deal v. Sexton,
144 N.C. 157, 56 S.E. 691 (1907).
17. 60 N.D. 527, 235 N.W. 496 (1931).
18. See Robinson v. Barrett, 142 Kan. 68, 45 P.2d 587,591 (1935) wherein the
court quotes Rasmusson v. Schmalenberger with approval.
19. In Rasmusson v. Schmalenburger, supra note 17, the court citing Mayall v. Mayal,
63_Mirn. 511, 65 N.W. 942 (1896) said: "A contingent interest in real estate is bound by
judicial proceedings affecting the property, where the court -had before it all the
parties that can be brought before it, and the court acts upon the property according
to the rights that appear, wihout fraud. These powers are inherent in a court of
equity, and rest upon considerations of necessity and expediency." See Johnson v. John-
son, 276 S.W. 776 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925) wherein the court reasoned: "The interest
in preserving this estate is just as strong on those who are living as it could be on
those who may be after born, and their interests in law just as much protected through
such representation as they would be were they actually in being and parties to the suit."
. 20. See, e.g., Townshend v. Frommer, 125 N.Y. 446, 26 N.E. 805 (1891) (suit
51 years after).
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In MaipArthur v. Scott,21 a prior suit setting aside a will was
declared invalid 46 years afterwards because of adverse interests
in the persons chosen to represent the contingent remaindermen.
The court stated: "[I]n every case there must be such parties be-
fore the court as to insure a fair trial of the issue in behalf of all."
In this state such action may be barred after twenty years through
the operation of the North Dakota Marketable Record Title Act.22
II. REPRESENTATION BY GUARDIAN AD LITEM OR TRUSTEE
In the Restatement of Property is the following:
"PREREQUISITES FOR BINDING EFFECT AS AGAINST
INTEREST LIMITED IN FAVOR OF AN UNBORN PERSON.
"A judicial proceeding has binding effect as against the future in-
terest limited in favor of a person who was unborn at the time of
the commencement of such proceeding ....
[if]
"(b) such person was duly represented by a guardian ad litem
appointed to protect the interest limited in favor of unborn per-
sons."
2 3
A guardian ad litem is one appointed by a court in which partic-
ular litigation is pending, as representative for a ward or an unborn
person in that particular litigation. 24 He occupies the position that
the "next friend" did under common law.5 Statutes authorizing
the appointment of a guardian ad litem to protect interests limited
in favor of unborn persons are common, 26 but many provide for
only a specific type of judicial proceeding.27 Such appointment
under statute is sufficient representation to bind the unborn persons
in a judicial proceeding.28
These statutes apply to cases in which no virtual representation
21. 113 U. S. 340 (1885).
22. N.D. Rev. Code c. 47-19A (Supp. 1957) which ink effect provides for a statute
of limitation to run against old claims to real estate, recorded- or not. The claim
holder can record notice within twenty years under which title is claimed by the record
title owner, and so preserve his claim. For a careful analysis of this legislation, see Leahy,
The North Dakota Marketable Record Title Act, 29 N. Dak. Law Rev. 265 (1953). It
should be noted -that this article deals with a thirty year period under N.D. Laws
1951, c. 280 which was amended by N.D. Laws 1957, c; 312.
23. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 182 (1936).
24. See State v. Bingham, 233 Ind. 504, 121 N.E.2d. 727,7 30 (1954); In re
Hallstead's Estate, 338 'Pa. 257, 12 A.2d 912. (1940).
25. See Shuck v. Shuck, 77 N.D. 628,631, 44 N.W.2d 767,770 (1950).
26. For listing of such statutes and'the type of judicial' proceeding to which they
apply, see 2 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 296-n;79 (1950).
27. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. Ann. § 508.18 (Wit'1948) which as to Registration VfA
Title provides: "rThe' court shall appolnt a disinterested person to act as guardian'
ad litem for minors, and other persons trder disability, and for all persons not in being
who may appear to have interest or lien upon the land .-.." -
.28. Copeland v. Wheelwright, 230 ,Mass. 131, 1,19 N.E. 667 (1918); Fisher v.
Fisher, 253 N.Y. 260, 170 N.E. 912 (1930).
1960]
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is possible and may provide a procedural alternative to such repre-
sentation.2 9 In Mennig v. Howard ° the court pointed out that the
rule of virtual representation was not sufficient to meet the cir-
cumstances and conditions of a case as to an unborn child of a
cotenant in real property. A guardian ad litem was appointed in
compliance with statute. 31 The court held that the unborn child's.
property was not being taken without due process.12 The court
further stated: "The possible injury to owners . . . is small in com-
parison to the indisputable benefit resulting from the sale, both to
the owner of the present estate and also to society at large. The
interest of society in free alienation of land has received recom-
mendations in many ways for centuries past."
North Dakota provides for a statutory guardian ad litem for in-
fants 33 and incompetents, 4 but no provision is made for unborn
children. Whether such appointment can be made under the gen-
eral power of equity, apart from statute, is questionable.35  The
American Law Institute takes no position on this problem. 36 In
Mabry v. Scott3 7 the court had under consideration a proposed
compromise of a trust involving unborn issue. In that case a guar-
dian ad litem had been appointed by the trial court to represent
and defend the interests of the unborn (and unconceived )issue.
The appellate court expressed approval of the action, saying:
"Courts of justice as an incident of their jurisdiction have inherent
power to appoint guardians ad litem," and cited cases, in each of
which however, there were living persons for whom such appoint-
ment was made. 8
When the unborn person is the prospective beneficiary of a trust,
it has been held the trustee can so represent the unborn person as
to make the result of the procedure binding on the interest limited
29. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 182 comment b (1936).
30. 213 Iowa 936, 240 N.W. 473 (1932).
31. Iowa Code § 12351-dl (1931). Today Iowa R. Civ. P. 298 provides: "'When
a person not in being may have a contingent or prospective vested interest as a cotenant
of real estate, the court shall have jurisdiction over the interest of such person, and
shall appoint a suitable guardian ad litem, to act for him in such proceeding .... ."
32. A discussion of the constitutionality of such appointments is also given in Loring
v. Hildreth, 170 Mass. 328, 49 N.E. 652 (1898).
33. N.D. Rev. Code §§ 28-0301, 28-0302 and 28-0303 (1943).
34. N.D. Rev. Code § 28-0304 (1943).
35. Since the statutes do not so provide, if such an appointment were made in North
Dakota, it would come under the general power of equity. However the adjudication of
our statutory provisions give no indication which way the court would go, if such
problem arose.
36. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 182, comment b (1936).
37. 51 Cal.App.2d 245 124 P.2d 569 (1942).
38. One of the cases cited by the court was Carraway v. Lassiter, 139 N.C. 145, 51
S.E. 968 (1905) wherein the court called a guardian ad litem, an "officer of the court."
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to such unborn person. 9  In Lewis v. McConclue40 a guardian ad
litem was appointed (in accord with statute) for minor defend-
ants and a trustee (without statutory authority) for unborn re-
maindermen. The court upheld the appointment of such trustee
under general rules of equity.
Appointment of either a guardian ad litem or a trustee by the
court, when the facts prerequisite for virtual representation are
not present, to act for the unborn remaindermen permits prompt
adjudication and eliminates the delay such future interest may
cause.
III. PROCEEDINGS WITHOUT REPRESENTATION
A. PROCEEDING IN REM
As to proceedings having binding effect as against the thing, the
Restatement reads as follows:
"(c) the proceeding, duly followed, was one binding the affected
thing itself, thus binding both present and future interests limited
therein, without either joinder or representation of the persons in
favor of whom such interests were limited."4 1
This represents another exception to the general rule that a-
judgment or decree binds only parties and privities. It is called
a proceeding "in rem"," and is typified by action in admiralty.43
Proceedings are in rem when they are directly against the prop-
erty and terminate in an adjudication against all mankind equally
binding upon everyone." Future interests are rarely, if ever, found
in cases which involve in rem proceedings.4"
In Drake v. Frazier46 the question arose whether the decree in
an in rem registration proceeding rendered against remaindermen
before they came into being was conclusive upon them, so as to bar
them from asserting their claims in future litigation., The court
held that they were bound, but applied the doctrine of virtual rep-
39. Temple v. Scott, 143 Ill. 290, 32 N.E. 366 (1892); Mayall v. Mayall, 63 Minn.
511, 65 N.W. 942 (1896). See Gunnell v. Palmer, 370 ll1. 206, 18 N.E.2d 202
(1938) wherein a statute was applied.
40. 151 Kan. 778, 100 P.2d 752 (1940).
41. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 182 (1936).
42. "The distinguishing characteristic of judgments in rem is, that wherever their
obligation is recognized and enforced as against any person, it is equally recognized
and enforced as against all persons." 3 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 1519 (5th ed.
1925).
43. See, e.g., The J.E. Rumbell, 148 U.S. 1 (1892); U.S. v. Malek Adhel, 43 U.S.
(2 How.) 209 (1844).
44. See Linn County v. Rozelle, 177 Ore. 245,.162 P.2d 150 (1945) wherein the court
also said: "They are quasi in rem when, although they deal with specific property
they adjudicate a controversy between the, particular parties to the proceeding."
45. 2 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 295 at 556 (1950).
46. 105 Neb. 162, 179 N.W. 393 (1920).
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resentation, since remaindermen in being with identical interests
were joined. Such application of this doctrine by the court, and
the fact that the statute governing the proceeding required publi-
cation and service, clearly take it outside the provisions of the
Restatement.47 This case indicates the reluctance by the courts -o
bind the unborn by in rem proceedings.
B. PROCEEDINGS UNDER UNKNOWN OWNER STATUTES
As to statutes making unnecessary the representation of an un-
born person, the Restatement reads as follows:
"(d) the proceeding, duly followed, was one which by statute
binds such future interest without either joinder or representation
of the person in favor of whom it was limited."4 8
• The "unknown owners" statutes, 49 when not in terms made ap-
plicable to unborn persons, have been construed to be inapplicable
to them.50 Some expressly provide for the case of unborn per-
sons,5 1 but North Dakota does not.52
Absence of adjudication of these statutes, as to unborn persons,
indicates that neither in rem nor unknown owner proceedings are
too important in the field of contingent remainders at the present
time.
CONCLUSION
As to prerequisites for binding effect as against interest limited
in favor of an unborn person, North Dakota adopts the Restate-
ment view only with respect to virtual representation. Where the
prerequisite facts necessary for the application of this doctrine are
not present, it is doubtful that a guardian ad litem would be ap-
47. RESTATEMENT, PROOPERTY § 182, comment c (1936) where it is said:
"When the proceeding is said to operate against the thing itself, but the owners of
interests therein are required to be served either by publication or by some variety
ol substituted service, then such proceeding is not within the rule stated in Clause (c)."
- 48.. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 182 (1936).
49. For a listing of these statutes, see 2 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 295 n.38
(1950). Note the usage of the term "unknown owner" in RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY
§ 182, comment d (1936). -
50. Mortimore v. Bashore, 317 Ill. 535, 148 N.E. 317 (1925).
51. See, e.g., Mont. Rev. Code Ann. § 93-2820 (1947) where it is stated: "When in
any action or proceeding persons are made defendants.by the designation of unknown
devisees. . .the judgment or decree. . .shall be conclusive as against the world, including
all contingent interests in the controversy and persons not in being who may have -an
interest 6i :contingent interest therein."
The'Ga. Code*Ann. § 36-310 (1947) as to proceedints in eminent domain, provides:
"If the owner or. owners of"tuch property . .'. are unknown, or there is a possibility of
unborn remaindermen having .an interest, notice shall be served upon the person in,
actual possession o6f the property, and also upon the ordinary, who shall act for said
unknown owner as provided for in the case of minors.
52. See N.D Rev: Code §§ 32-1705 (Joinder of Defendants) ard 321706- (Who
joined as Undhkbivn"Persons) and 32-1707-- (Srvice-on Unknown Defendant; How -Made;
affidavit for-' Ptxbllcatiop) (1943) ND. "Riles1 C. Proc. 4(g) Sievice by Publication;
When Permitted).
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pointed to represent such unborn interest in the absence of an ex-
press statutory provision, which is lacking here at the present time.
It would seem, however, that appointment of either a guardian ad
litem or a trustee could be made through powers inherent in a
court of justice in a proper case.
DAvID C. JOHNSON.
-JURISDICTION OVER INDIAN COUNTRY
IN NORTH DAKOTA
INDIANS
There is no definition of an Indian applicable to all situations,
consequently, each jurisdiction has its own definition for its own
purposes. The decisions on this question have been so diverse that
on occasion a white man has been considered an Indian' and an
Indian not an Indian2 for legal purposes.
The federal government has defined who is an Indian by legis-
lation3 for various purposes and there have been judicial definitions
by the United States Supreme Court.4 The definitions by the fed-
eral government, which has been dealing with Indians longer than
most states, have not been consistent and perhaps necessarily so
because of treaty obligations 5 and policy reasons.'
The North Dakota Supreme Court in State v. Kuntz held that
one who is of the half-blood, a member of an Indian tribe, lives
on the tribal reservation, and is treated by the Bureau of Indian
affairs of the United States government as an Indian is an Indian.
It is doubted that the court meant this to be a definition to be fol-
lowed by North Dakota courts since to do so would exclude those
of less than half-blood even though he met the other criteria stated.
More persuasive and decisive would be whether or not a person -is
treated as an Indian by the federal government since if he were
treated as an Indian his real property and some of his personal
1. Nofire v. United States, 164 U.S. 657 (1897).
2. United States ex rel. Standing Bear v. Crook, 25 Fed. Cas. 695,"No. 14891 (C.C.
Neb. 1879).
3. 48 Stat. 988 (1934), 25 U.S.C. 479 ,(1958); 40 Stat. 564 (1918,-25 U.S.C.
297 (1928).
4. United States v. Higgins, 103. Fed. 348 (1900); see Sully v. United States, 195
Fed. 113, 129 (1912) where one-eighth bloods were "of sufficient Indian blood to sub-
stantially handicap them in the struggle for existence'! and therefOie Indians.5. See treaty obligations recognizing mixed-bloods listed in Cohen, Handbook of
Federal Indian Law, 3, n.14 (1945).
6. 68 Stat. 868 (1954), 25 U.S.C. 677-677aa (1958) (termination of federal supervision
over the property of mixed-bloods).
7. 66 N.W.2d 531, 533 (N.D. 1954).
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